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A Cross Cultural Analysis of Several
Forms of Parenting
Mother, Genitrix, and Mater
MICHAEL R. HILL

-- "The issue here is not so much technological as sociological."
Herbert Brait, attorney
--

"Even an infant needs her own space."
Harvey Sorkow, judge

Introduction
Private Troubles and Public Issues

Melissa Stern was born March 27, 1986, in New Jersey. For one so
young, she has experienced or been the subject of interstate flight and
fugitive hegira, legal battles involving her own court-appointed
attorney, social controversy, the voracious attention of an insensitive
media industry, and a place in history as the famous Baby "M". Judge
Sorkow (1987: 26-27), in his opinion awarding custody of Melissa to
her genetic father and terminating all parental rights of her genetic
mother, notes professional evaluations indicating Melissa to be a "a
mellow, alert, easy-to-care-for child who is blessed with a 'sunniness of
disposition that is a delight to see. ' " She is also "a curious and social
baby and adjusts to her strangers and social situtations easily." One
hopes these resilient character traits flower as Melissa matures and
discovers the intricacies in which her personal biography has become
inextricably enmeshed in the public issues of American social conflict.
The following analysis is offered with a view to explicating the
interconnected personal troubles and public issues now drifting
toward yet another reconsideration of a primary American social
institution: family. This blatantly sociological enterprise has its own
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of social change (Giddens, 1987a, 1987b), but it is also hoped that this
analysis will at some future time make at least some sense to Melissa
herself.
Confronting distinctly personal troubles is by no means a unique
experience in this society. Many of us, in the process of maturation,
have acquired a substantial cache of guilty secrets, unresolved
conflicts, desperate hopes, doubts, injustices, frustrations, betrayals,
and stupidly bungled projects. We are often prime architects of our
foibles, but at times we play the unwitting if not unwilling dupe to the
deceptive fabrications, insanities, and insensitivities of friends and
fellows who abuse our trust (Goffman, 1974/1986). These private
troubles are the existential stuff of life in human society as it is now
organized. Much that Melissa Stern has encountered and will continue
to meet are personal troubles that only she can recognize, pick her way
through, and presumably resolve with dignity and growth.
Melissa's life journey began in the private troubles of her father,
William Stern, and his wife, Elizabeth Stern. The Sterns wanted to
raise a family (hardly a nefarious project in this intensely familistic
society), but discovered that Elizabeth Stern's incipient (and hopefully
mild) mUltiple sclerosis made pregnancy an unacceptable risk.
Discouraged by their exploratory inquiries concerning adoption, the
Sterns eventually learned about and investigated the possibility of
surrogate reproduction. The consummation of a surrogate
reproduction contract between William Stern, Mary Beth Whitehead,
and her husband, Richard Whitehead, led to Mary Beth's artificial
insemination with William's sperm and the subsequent birth of a baby
girl, now known as Melissa Stern. As part of this arrangement,
William agreed to pay $10,000 to Mary Beth who in turn agreed to
sever her parental rights where the newborn baby was concerned.
Had this plan gone as proposed (as hundreds of similar
arrangements in fact have), Melissa's troubles would have been much
reduced. Instead, Melissa's mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, became
enmeshed in unforeseen personal troubles of her own. Among others,
she decided to retain her parental rights and to raise the baby girl
within her own family. These events set the stage for a deeply
emotional drama in which two sets of legally incompatible personal
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troubles, those of William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead, collided
head on resulting in Melissa's well-chronicled odyssey. A vortex of
personal troubles, claims and counterclaims ensued, entangling not
only Melissa and her genetic parents, but also Elizabeth Stern,
Richard Whitehead, the Whitehead's two children, Melissa's maternal
grandparents, and friends of both families. Were this the full story,
however, Harvey Sorkow's (1987) juridical resolution of these troubles
would not have made front page headlines in national newspapers (see,
for example, Hanley, 1987a, 1987b; New York Times, 1987; Shipp,
1987).
The private troubles of the assembled litigants and concerned
parties became a catalyst wherein several public issues surfaced,
became inflamed, and developed lives oftheir own which have nothing
whatever to do with the happiness and well-being of Melissa, the little
girl with the sunny disposition. Thus, we encounter here an unusually
cataclysmic intersection of public issues and private troubles. Whereas
Melissa must eventually come to grips with the notoriety of her own
biography, she will do well to recognize that neither she nor her
parents created the public issues that catapulted her into the history
books. Her multiple parents only tried to resolve their own private
troubles in their own ways. It was only later that they -- and the rest of
us -- discovered that their private troubles were shared by many -- and
could potentially be shared by a quite significant portion of our
society. As Mills (1959) helps us understand, the personal troubles of
the Sterns and the Whiteheads resonated in a loud, dissonant chorus
echoing the public issues of a capitalist, patriarchal, and familistic
society.
Sociological Imagination and Family
The myriad public issues finding voice in Judge Sorkow's New
Jersey courtroom are rooted in our most enduring social patterns,
including: family, law, religion, politics, partriarchy, racism,
capitalism, and class. In this chapter, I concentrate on issues related to
family. There is a tendency when investigating or thinking about
matters related to these patterns to reify them, to conceptualize them
as essentially immutable, fundamental, intrinsic, unquestionable.
Understanding the actual map of our social world in this taken-for-
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intellectual discipline and sensitivity (Giddens, 1987a; Goffman,
1974/1986; Deegan and Hill, 1987; Mead, 1934; Reinharz, 1979/1984;
Rubin, 1976; Schutz, 1971; Taft, 1915/1987). Comprehending that our
taken-for-granted institutions often assume radically different forms
than posessed -- or recognized -- at present requires a degree of insight
and reflexivity possessed by few people, including sociologists. With
this in mind, Giddens (1978a, 1987b) argues for the practical necessity
of adopting "the sociological imagination so eloquently outlined by
the distinguished American sociologist, C. Wright Mills (1959). If we
fail to critically examine history, anthropology, and alternative futur~s
as Mills and Giddens advocate, we run the almost certain risk of
entrapping ourselves in reifications, ethnocentrism, and political
impotence.
Most commentators agree that surrogate reproduction is intimately
linked to the institution of "family". Failure to adopt historical and
anthropological sensitivities, however, leads to strange, ethnocentric
pronouncements about presumed universal aspects of family and
parenting. Sensitive social scientists help us avoid such mistakes. Julia
Kristeva (1974/1986), for example, provides a deep, texturally
complex analysis of the meanings of motherhood and family in
Chinese and western societies. Even within the restricted orbit of the
industrialized countries of the contemporary world, however, history
reveals a range of family forms and child rearing practices (Poster,
1978) that would cause many narrow-minded, self-righteous defenders
of mythically invariant family morality to retreat in embarrassment,
hopefully with apologies for their insensitive bigotry. Jessie Bernard
(1972/1982) demonstrated the surprisingly varied ways in which
modern Americans arrange themselves in conjugal groupings of
greater and lesser duration and commitment, including: traditional
marriage, communes, cooperatives, one-night stands, swinging,
intimate networks, households of unrelated individuals, serial
trois, group marriage,
polygamy, geriatric marriage, menage
companionate celibacy, and feminist households. Add to this list the
variations devised by gays and lesbians and the permutations are
formidable. Human beings invent, experiment, and adapt, often with
vigor, grace, good humor and commitment. They also bungle, cheat,

a
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and unreflexively lump this diversity and playfulness under the rubric
of "sin", but these are people who lack a sociological imagination -- to
say the least. The best critical evidence leaves us with what is to some a
startling conclusion: there is no such thing as the natural family form.
We give life to many family forms, all as natural as the next, some
enjoying greater or lesser popularity at different times and among
various subgroups in western societies.
The image of the "ideal" independent conjugal nuclear family
(husband, wife, and their jointly produced genetic children) has been
powerfully projected as the family as though this form is more
"natural" or legitimate than any other possible arrangement. The
reasons why this particular familial pattern has received massive
ideological approval in American society lie beyond the scope of this
chapter, but interested readers will find a good introduction to several
fundamental public issues in Barrett and McIntosh (1982). The point
here is that discussions of surrogate reproduction get caught in
needlessly convoluted distortions and serious conceptual mistakes if
their authors assume from the outset that there is really only one kind
of legitimate and natural family form.
Multiple Parenting
A cross-cultural perspective on the forms of parenthood lets Melissa
Stern rationally locate herself in a matrix of mUltiple parents. On
examination, we see that multiple parentage is quite common, even
among families who believe themselves to be model examples of the
independent conjugal nuclear type. The possibilities for mUltiple
parenting are not new, but they have been augmented by recent
developments in bio-techno-medical research (cryrogenics, gene
splitting, in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, especially). One
thing needs to be said, however: that the surrogate reproductive
procedures (artificial insemination) resulting ultimately in Melissa's
birth are exceptionally low-tech and do not depend intrinsically on
medical intervention. Indeed, were it not for the cultural mores of the
reproductive partners in surrogacy arrangements, impregnation could
be readily achieved through normal coition. Whereas genuine and
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these concerns, insofar as they are generated by technology per se, do
not apply to surrogate reproduction ofthe type which brought Melissa
into this world.
Given the disparate variations in marriage and parenting found
trans-historically worldwide, it makes sense anthropologically to
speak of forms of parenthood. These general patterns, three each for
mothers and fathers, are outlined in Table 1. Theforms offatherhood,
for example, can all be filled by one person. This result is assumed in
the "ideal" independent conjugal nuclear family. The husband is the
genetic father. As genitor, he nurtures and sustains his wife during her
pregnancy. Finally, in the role of pater, he helps rear and socialize the
young child. Thus, if we mistakenly assume that the independent
conjugal nuclear family is the only natural family form, we are likely to
erroneously conflate the various forms of fatherhood.
If we take a broad view, as the sociological imagination suggests we
should, we find that fatherhood roles in some cultures are distributed
over a large number of people. While only one male can technically be
the genetic father, some biologically naive and promiscuous groups
believe and act upon the idea that it is possible for a woman to be the
genetic father. Sustenance during pregnancy can be accomplished by
several males, and is sometimes required in a somewhat unusual-- to
contemporary occidental ears -- variation in societies where it is
believed that the fetus will grow only if the mother has coitus on a
frequent basis with several males during pregnancy. The presumption
is that the seminal fluid nourishes the fetus. It is this relatively rare
belief and practice from which the term "genitor" derives, but support
of the mother and her fetus certainly includes many possibilities other
than coital service. Additional forms of nurture can be easily identified
and provided by a wide range of persons. These include emotional
resources, financial aid, medical assistance, and birthing preparation.
Finally, following the child's nativity, the newborn may be raised by
yet another father, or even by a group of men who share equally or
hierarchically in the pater role.
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TABLE 1:

Forms of Parenthood
FEMALE

MALE

Genetic Father
(contributes sperm)

Genetic Mother
(contributes egg)

Genitor
(provides supportive
environment for
pregnant
genitrix)

Genitrix
(provides gestation
and/ or supportive
environment for
pregnant genitrix)

Pater
(provides care and
socialization of child

Mater
(provides care and
socialization of child)

****
By analogy, a similar analysis is possible for motherhood. The roles
of genetic mother, genitrix, and mater are all filled by the wife in the
"ideal" conjugal nuclear family. In vitro fertilization, however, makes
it possible to clearly separate these three roles. For example, an egg
supplied by one woman (genetic mother) is fertilized and implanted in
a second (genitrix), with the resulting child raised by a third (mater).
These roles are also open to cooperative arrangements. For example,
nurturing a pregnant woman can be shared, thus expanding the role of
genitrix to non-pregnant but supportiye women. Finally, any number
of women can be designated or seek to be maters, taking responsibility
for the care and socialization of the newborn.
Looking at parenthood in this way absolves Melissa from
unnecessary confusion and fruitless questions such as "Who are my
real parents?" In reality, she has mUltiple parents who have clearly
identifiable roles, all essential to Melissa's conception, gestation, birth,
and subsequent well being. All her parents have made real
contributions. One the male side, her genetic father is William Stern,
her genitors are William Stern (who paid the medical bills) and
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Richard Whitehead (who saw his wife through her pregnancy), and her
pater is now William Stern (assuming that Judge Sorkow's custody
decision is not reversed or significantly modified). On the female side,
her genetic mother and genitrix is Mary Beth Whitehead. The court
record indicates that Elizabeth Stern, herself a physician, participated
in an ancillary genitrix role by giving emotional reinforcement and
medical advice. Her primary mater will be Elizabeth Stern (and may
include Mary Beth Whitehead in a secondary mater role if subsequent
courts allow visitation). This accounting of Melissa's various parents
appears bizarre only if one applies the unique and anthropologically
strange case of the "ideal" independent conjugal nuclear family as
one's point of reference.
In fact, such mUltiple parent situations are not at all unusual. They
are commonly found in families involving death of a spouse and
subsequent remarriage by the survivor; in families dissolved and
reassembled through the increasingly common practice of serial
polygamy; and in families formed by adoption and foster parenting.
Surrogate reproduction adds no new twists to parenting roles already
in place and socially accepted.
Parenting: Ideology' and Praxis

Our concepts of family and parenthood are changing, but
sometimes we let obvious, easily assimilated changes slip away
unnoticed when our rhetoric becomes intemperate and ethnocentric.
We forget that the "ideal" independent conjugal nuclear family is, in
fact, far from common in practice when we look closely at the
parenting roles in American society. With high rates of teenage
promiscuity and pregnancy, not to mention multiple-partner sexual
liasons among adults both married and single, it is reasonable to
conclude that in significantly increasing number of pregnancies there
is no congruence between the genetic father and the genitor/pater in
many so-called "ideal" marriages. Without a court test and paternity
evidence provided to the contrary, the vast majority in this society are
quite happy to assume and act as though the husband in a conjugal
nuclear family is necessarily the genetic father of his children, even
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conclusions.
When we reflect comprehensively on the ways in which parenting
roles are currently distributed in American society, the ideological
hypocrisy that conflates parenting praxis with the "ideal"
independent conjugal nuclear family quickly crumbles. For example,
participants in popular prenatal birthing programs often utilize
someone other than the genetic father to fill the genitor / genetrix role
as "coach" for breathing exercises. Courts appoint guardians to
represent the interests of unborn children, a legal institutionalization
of the genitor / genitrix role. Many children find themselves paired to
mUltiple maters and paters (and fictive kin) through the widespread
practice of appointing godparents in religious rituals. I leave
untouched the various roles adopted by grandparents, some having
sued successfully in court to establish visitation with their
grandchildren.
Bitterly contested custody suits attending divorce create
unfortunate acrimony and sorrow, but reasonably amicable custody
resolutions appear much more the norm. Our society is readily and
easily legitimating remarriages wherein wives and husbands frequently
become maters and paters to children where others (often faceless
unknowns, sometimes not) fulfilled the role of genetic parent as well as
genitor or genitrix. The growing number of single parent families (of
several types) calls for a pragmatic redefinition of "family" and
parenting roles. This call is increasingly hard to ignore. Expanding day
care service widens opportunities for more men and women of the
community to participate in the pater and mater role (in addition to
traditional pater/mater niches such as school teaching, scout
leadership, and Big Brother/ Big Sister programs). We must account
also for the in loco parentis responsibilities of boarding schools and
colleges, the roles of nannies, wetnurses, baby sitters, and others who
act as mater and pater on intermittant as well as regular bases. In short,
although the concept of parenthood in this society is frequently
conflated with the ideological ideal of the independent conjugal
nuclear family, we generally act quite differently, routinely splitting
parenthood roles and assigning their performance to a surprisingly
wide variety of individuals. There is a conceptual gap between what we
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say we believe parenthood to be and what we actually take-for-granted
and act upon where parenting is concerned.
There are some who would blindly ban the distribution of parenting
roles that accompany surrogate reproduction. Such proposals are
authored by unthinking critics who do not see that precisely the same
distributions can be accomplished by misadventure using fully
legitimated routes. Consider this hypothetical example: A man and
woman marry, but subsequently discover that the woman cannot have
children. Family, friends, and neighbors whisper in guarded tones,
"My, my what a shame, he would make such a good father." The
couple tries to redefine their childlessness as a positive opportunity for
interpersonal growth, but they are told they are "selfish" to think that
way. Family and friends, however, continually remind the couple of
their "disappointment" and "tragedy". Succumbing to self-doubt and
other pressures, the marriage ends as the couple is unable to
conceptualize a meaningful future. The man quickly remarries, but not
wisely. A child is born of this new union, a child who almost
immediately becomes the subject of a bitter custody challenge and the
center of rancorous divorce proceedings in which the man eventually
agrees to pay $10,000 in alimony as a move to "get his manipulative
new wife off his back." In light of documented circumstances which
throw reasonable doubt on the ability of the mother to provide a
nurturant and stable home, the court awards custody ofthe child to the
man, a not uncommon event in this day and age. Time passes.
Eventually, the man and his first wife begin dating again and discover
to their mutual delight that they hadn't really given marriage a chance.
They remarry and the woman eventually adopts the child as her own.
Were this a movie script, would we not feel pangs of sympathy, at least
for the child who has found a happy home in the midst of an otherwise
troubled and imperfect world? I think so. And if we can, then I think
we can feel ever so much better about Melissa and her new life with the
Sterns, a life that the Sterns wanted, planned, and presumably prayed
for.
I do not assert that the above hypothetical case and the surrogate
reproduction arrangement entered by William Stern and the
Whiteheads are in any way similar in terms of intent. But, I do argue
that the resulting parenthood roles and many of the structural
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legitimated sequence of events that has much the same result as
surrogate reproduction by simply resorting to a variation on serial
polygamy. Indeed, were surrogate reproduction to be outlawed, as
some propose, I suspect it would not be long before persons would
collude to purposefully implement a moderately complicated threestage scenario (marriage-divorce / second marriage-pregnancy-divorcecustody & alimony settlement/ remarriage-adoption) in much the
same way that many couples a few years ago routinely divorced and
remarried annually in order to gain federal tax benefits based on
marital status. Human beings are remarkably inventive and
resourceful when push come to shove. It is mistaken to think that
simply outlawing a practice means, in our insititutionally redundant
bureaucratic society, that it cannot be accomplished legally by other
fully legitimate, socially acceptable procedures.
Legislation and Emancipatory Futures
It is wise to be wary when male-dominated legal, medical, and

political professions dip their collective hands in any till where large
sums of public and private funds are freely flowing and the interests of
newborn babies are at stake. With regard to surrogacy, thoughtful
people have raised several issues of concern (see, for example, Brail,
1987; Harvard Law Review, 1986; Hollinger, 1985; Katz, 1986;
Mellown, 1985; Sorkow, 1987), but most nonetheless see a role for
surrogacy in specifiable circumstances. Avi Katz (1986), for example,
in a paper awarded the Columbia Law Women's Association Prize,
meticulously puts to rest the false equation of surrogacy with baby
selling and reviews the efficacy of various approaches to surrogacy
legislation. These analysts are of one voice in calling for legislative
guidance to institutionalize equity for all parties involved in surrogate
reproduction.
Writing and enacting legislation is a social project, one which
defines, enables, and limits human action. Present laws become
frameworks within future humans (some like ourselves, and some no
doubt quite different - at least in their values) will reproduce, raise
families, and even marry. Thoughtful legislation in a democratic
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society creates opportumties for emancipatory alternative futures
which may be at present beyond our ken. Articulating such futures is
one of the main tasks of sociology (Giddens, 1987a, 1987b; Hill, 1984;
Mills, 1959). These futures are the critical and political produce of
active sociological imagination.
Caution is advised such that we do not ethnocentrically, too quickly,
or unnecessarily, bar socially and personally beneficial avenues to life,
liberty, and happiness. Legislative action requires anthropological,
historical, and critical sensibilites in order to strike an
equitable and emancipatory balance between public policies and
personal interests. Emancipatory social consciousness calls forth selfdetermination, mutual understanding and public cooperation (Mead,
1934; Taft, 1915/1987). I hope these goals will be uppermost in the
minds of legislators who draft and vote on bills designed to regulate
surrogacy. Legislation encouraging cooperative social consciousness
and structurally supporting its realization can only be applauded. It is
certain that surrogacy statutes will be enacted. I urge here that,
whatever else is accomplished by codification, we not run roughshod
over the emancipatory potentials called forth by hundreds of people
who, in resolving their private troubles, have given life to surrogacy as
a focus of public issues. At the least, these issues include the following:
upward mobility, feminist sisterhood, inter-class solidarity, ethnic and
communal legacies, and renewed sensitivity to the needs and status of
orphans.
Upward Mobility: Much has been made in sensational popular
accounts concerning the relatively large, lump-sum fees paid to
surrogate mothers. Before uncritically dismissing these payments to
the genetic mother / genitrix as exploitive, there is another dimension
to be explored, one in which these sums play an enabling,constructive,
emancipatory role. Opportunities for working-class women to gather
substantial sums of money at one place within a constrained time
period in this society are virtually non-existent. Critics who would bar
these women and their families from financial resources that could
easily purchase a major life-dream (a habitable home, needed surgery,
a child's college education, and so on), should more closely examine
their own class biases. A careful reading of Rubin's (1976) brilliant
exploration oflife in working-class families will help sensitize even the
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most complacent middle-class pundit. If we are serious about class
leveling and upward mobility, then we should be cautious about
shutting the door on equitably reimbursed surrogacy arrangements
between freely consenting parties.
I do not know what the Whiteheads plan to do with the surrogacy
fee paid by the Sterns, that is their own private trouble. Given the
special origin of the money, attendant as it is on Melissa's birth, one
hopes it might be dedicated to a constructive project found especially
meaningful by the Whiteheads. Melissa Stern should be encouraged to
feel joy insofar as the familial desire that brought her into this world
not only gave delight to William and Elizabeth Stern but also resulted
in a rare, beneficent material opportunity for the family of Mary Beth
and Richard Whitehead.
Sad to say, a professor I know recently expounded venomously that,
"Surrogate mothers only want to see their babies grow up in
comfortable upper middle-class home!" Presumably, I and others in
his audience were supposed to think this goal unconscionable. A black
woman sitting nearby was heard to say in a loud stage whisper, "It sure
beats living in the ghetto!" I concur. Families, with full social
approval, have long used marriage as a mechanism for upward
mobility. Impoverished mothers have routinely given up their genetic
children to adopting maters and paters, "So the kids could have
a better chance at life." To impugn identical motivations when they
surface in the hearts of mUltiple parents freely engaged in surrogate
reproduction is not equitable. That we have such gross material
inequality, that is the unconscionable reality, one that is a genuine
public issue (Scott, 1984). Given that barbarous inequality is the order
of the day, can we blame people who want something better for their
genetic offspring, if not for themselves? The prospects for Melissa's
material future seem especially bright. Whatever her other personal
troubles, financial want is not likely to be among them. I doubt she will
begrudge this fact in the years to come.

Feminist Sisterhood: Volumes of journals, pamphlets, and
responsible treatises call women worldwide to unite in sisterhood and
mutual support. This call is a creative response to a public issue: the
iron grip of patriarchy on our institutional structures. Many women
who have served as surrogate mothers report their extraordinary
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pleasure at being able to form a bond with a woman who desires but
otherwise could not have children, giving her the inestimable gift of a
young infant. The potential for building and repeating such bonds in a
growing woman-to-woman network of love and affection between
genetic mothers, genetrix, and maters, calls for our encouragement
when amicable parties are willing and competent to join in this way.
Surrogacy is by no means the only or even a central basis for feminist
solidarity, but neither is it reprehensible nor deserving of degrading
epithets (i.e., mother machines, cows, breeders, baby sellers, etc.).
It is unfortunate that society did not stand ready to help Mary Beth
Whitehead and Elizabeth Stern preserve the bonds they began to
establish but which shattered in the heat of personal troubles writ large
in public courtroom litigation. Our patriarchal society is notoriously
intolerant of feminism. The structure of law in this case exacerbates
the personal troubles of Mary Beth and Elizabeth, artificially pitting
them in adversarial opposition rather than calling forth their mutual
interests as mUltiple parents.

Critics should note that most surrogate reproduction agreements
between mUltiple parents do not land in court, even in the absence of
equity establishing legislation. Indeed, it is the parties to traditional
conjugal nuclear marriages who find themselves in court with
considerably greater frequency arguing over the best interests of their
children. I suspect that the astoundingly quiet consummation and
fulfillment of nearly all other mUltiple parenting arrangements
effected through surrogacy draws deeply on real bonds of sisterhood
for success, strength, and meaning. We must be careful not to foil this
potential for feminist bonding.
In the case at hand, Melissa will do well to understand that it was
unusual for sisterhood to collapse, for her mater to be selected
juridically (Judge Sorkow arranged for Elizabeth Stern to sign
adoption papers immediately following the reading of his custody
decision). Reading his opinion, hopefully Melissa will grant Judge
Sorkow now only wisdom but also the latitude for fallibility we all
need when making difficult decisions based on necessarily limited
data. In the mature resolution of her own personal troubles, Melissa
may find the strength, insight, and inclination to mend the broken
bonds of sisterhood between her genetic mother / genetrix and her
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responsibility to call forth conciliation, but we can give her every
support if she should be so spunky as to try. If she does, she should
realize, however, that a long history of patriarchal patterns is stacked
against her.
Inter-Class Solidarity: The potential for feminist bonding parallels
a novel opening for solidarity between economist classes based on
shared interests in children. Critics have correctly noted that present
surrogacy arrangements are asymmetrical: the surrogate mother is
almost invariably of lower class standing than the genetic father. None
that I know of however, have argued for mechanisms that could
restore the balance somewhat, such as charitable foundations who
could fund surrogacy reproduction when the participants involved
could not afford it. Indeed, a portion of the fees now going to attorneys
could be legislatively diverted to capitalize this proposed foundation.
Short of such funding, however, other opportunities for improved
inter-class relations based on surrogate reproduction and multiple
parenting should not be ignored. For example, the Sterns agreed to
provide Mary Beth Whitehead with "an annual picture and letter
report of progress" detailing Melissa's development (Sorkow,
1987:31). This minimal communication is more significant and
interpersonally meaningful than generally occurs between most upper
middle-class and working-class families.
Giddens (1981) convincingly shows that class relations in
industrialized societies are far more complexly textured than
orthodox marxists (or most of the more conservative sociologists, for
that matter) are willing to grant. Recognizing and acting on class
complexity is a public issue which to date has received little if any
legislative consideration. We now have an opportunity for action. The
many-faceted matrix of class/ parent relationships theoretically
possible in multiple parenthood echoes Gidden's account of class as a
variegated social phenomenon. Surrogate reproduction agreements,
however, move concretely, enacting these possibilities in reality,
giving birth to a new form of complex inter-class relation based in
mUltiple parenthood roles. This new inter-class relation provides a
structure - and well-being of multiple-parented children provides
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motivation -- for calling forth deep mutual understanding across class
lines. This opportunity, as a public issue, should not be lightly rejected.
Ethnic Heritage and Communal Legacies: Melissa also carries
forward, through her genetic makeup and socialization by her pater,
William Stern, a very special legacy that rises from the ashes of World
War II. In examining the actual features of Melissa's biography, it is
sobering to realize that shortly after Elizabeth Stern learned in late
1979 that she had mUltiple sclerosis and should avoid pregnancy,
William Stern became the last surviving member of all branches of his
family to escape the Nazi Holocaust when his mother died in 1983
(Brail, 1987; Sorkow, 1987). While some critics condemn the
presumed egocentric biological snobbery of men who use
extraordinary means to become genetic fathers, such condemnation is
wholly unpardonable and insensitive in this case. It is hard to
underestimate or feel unsympathetic to the significance William Stern
was entitled to place on becoming a genetic father given the
intersection of his personal biography with the public issue of
genocide. Melissa's inheritance is not simply genetic, it is communal,
religious, historic. She has received a special legacy to treasure. To
infer otherwise, even remotely, commits a most reprehensible act of
anti-semitism and is an immense disservice to William Stern. We
should turn with welcome to the emancipatory possibilities created by
surrogacy for preserving ethnic and communal identities threatened
with extinction.
Orphans Reconsidered: Finally, critics have argued vehemently
that surrogacy is a slap in the face to orphaned children who have not
been, and may never be adopted. Mellown (1985) makes this case more
cogently than most. The essence of the argument is that surrogacy
should not be permitted unless adoptable children are first placed in
loving and supportive homes. There are several problems with this
reasoning, although Mellown's sympathies are clearly admirable.
First, an assumption is made that life in orphanages or with foster
parents is necessarily injurious and unsatisfactory. In fact, many such
settings are far safer and more nurturant than many so-called
"normal" homes which continue to spawn nightmarish public records
of child neglect, abuse, and injury. Second, many institutionalized
children have serious problems requiring the specialized attention of a
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quite so serious as Judge Sorkow (1987) painted it, it is still severe.
Fourth, critics should note that adoption procedures are also class
biased in invidious ways. Members of the middle class much more
easily demonstrate the characteristics deemed appropriate during
screening by adoption agency personnel. Finally, if there is a major
group of competent, healthy children who really need homes (an
unanalyzed and untested assumption at this point), this is a public
issue in its own right. It is not solved by banning surrogacy. Childless
couples should not be held anymore responsible than anyone else for
providing homes for children who lack adequate maters and paters.
Childless persons should be asked to do no more than to share
equitably in a scheme that distributes adoptable children to maters and
paters across the board.
An unnecessary private trouble is thrust on Melissa by writers who
conflate the issues of surrogacy and adoption. Melissa must not be
given any reason to think that she might be "taking someone else's
place" anymore than is the proverbial kid next door. Nor should
youngsters with institutionalized, non-familial maters and paters be
encouraged to think their lives diminished or degraded by the fact of
Melissa's or anyone else's existence. At the same time, if surrogacy
serves as a catalyst for rethinking our adoption/ orphanage situation
and related public policies, so much the better. This, too, is a positive
and potentially emancipatory outcome.
Conclusion: Space for Melissa Stern

Scurrilous commentators wrongly impugn not only the motives of
the Whiteheads and the Sterns, but also denigrate the morality, sanity,
and civic responsibility of any person who dares enter a surrogate
reproduction agreement (for especially vituperative examples, see
Corea, 1985: 213-249; and Pollitt, 1987). I believe the language and
derogatory labeling used in these pseudo-rational accounts is harmful,
not only to mUltiple parents and children generally, but in this specific
case to the Whiteheads, the Sterns, and especially to Melissa.
Elsewhere, I call attacks of this type a form of
"intellectual violence" which hurts rather than emancipates (Hill,
1985). We must be more careful to comment on public issues in ways
that separate public concerns from private troubles. We do well to
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pUblic.
Charges of criminal baby selling, class exploitation, sexism,
unconscionable selfishness, and biological bigotry have issued from
journalists (some even claiming - falsely - to be feminist) who write
about surrogate parenting. If such charges were true and tied
intrinsically to surrogate reproduction per se in especially
destructive ways, then it might be justified to heap injury, reproach,
and opprobrium upon private people who want nothing more radical
than to have babies and rear families. Considered reflection suggests,
however, that these charges are not true, nor are they problems unique
or intrinsic to surrogate reproduction. Persons interested seriously
in Melissa Stern's legal and social history are well advised to read the
full text of Judge Sorkow's (1987) decision. In it, one finds the
surrogacy is not the focal point ofthe case. Rather, it is Melissa Stern,
her needs, her dependencies, her future. Baby "M" is not a symbol for
abstracted social causes, it is a pseudonym of an actual person who will
laugh, play, cry, and grow to maturity in our communal midst. As
fellow humans, it is our job to support her as we can. As a sociologist, I
have tried to explain for her that she is not a freak and that her parents
are not ogres, that neither she nor her parents are in any way
responsible for the storm of controversy, charges and counter charges
that greeted her birth. As with any life, Melissa's is worth celebrating
and protecting. I am moved by Judge Sorkow's (1987: 121) closing
comment:
Melissa needs stability and peace, so that she can be nurtured
in a loving environment free from chaos and sheltered from the
public eye.
I really do not know why persons want to become parents, it seems
such a lot of work, worry, and - often as not - disappointment and
heartache. On the other hand, neither do I know why some among us
are so bent on viciously punishing those who would move mountains
to become parents. I suspect a long, repressive, right-wing hidden
agenda motivates these intolerant hacks, but an explication of my
suspicions would take us well beyond the scope of this chapter. What I
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talking about real parents, real babies, and real futures. We could do
much worse than heed Judge Sorkow's closing admonition.
The facts attending Melissa Stern's arrival in the human community
instructively demonstrate the unfolding of personal biography in the
context of social institutions, the weaving of distinctive tapestries with
private woof and public warp. The sociological imagination expands
our ability to understand and comprehend these interlacing
patterns, to rescue family and parenthood from myopic, hypocritical
conflation, to explore the vitality and variety of human invention.
Human society is not fixed, but experimental, malleable by selfdetermined citizens working with mutual understanding to reach
widespread social cooperation. Melissa Stern has already given us a
great gift, an opportunity to celebrate her life by seeking emancipatory
futures for us all. In return, we can give Melissa the gift of privacy,
peace, and freedom - a space of her own.
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